The paper explores various measures of institutional quality in Russian regions, and compares those measures to each other. Such analysis leads to the conclusion that Russian regional institutions are essentially multidimensional, and therefore comparisons of Russian regions in terms of their overall institutional quality could be problematic. New institutional indices are derived from Russian enterprise surveys held under the BEEPS project of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development. Such indices yield economy and bureaucracy in their regions. Dynamics of regional institutional indices is investigated against the backdrop of Russia-wide institutional trends.
Introduction
Successes and failures in economic development are associated with instituless favorable environments for economic activity. Effective institutions support entrepreneurship, attract investments, and promote economic growth. In contrast, stagnation and poverty, even when resources are abundant, are usually associated Once it is realized how important institutions are for economic development, it is natural to make an attempt to measure institutional quality. Interest in such measures occurs for at least three reasons. First, entrepreneurs and investors who choose countries and regions for their operations need assessments of the investment climate in prospective jurisdictions. Second, these indicators are useful in assessments of the performance of government agencies by voters, higher authorities (in the case of regions), and by international organizations, groups on the quality of national institutions. Measurable improvement of instiand campaign promises, as recently happened in Russia. Finally, analysts need these ratings to forecast the development of national and regional economies, to of various factors (e.g., history, geography, public policy, social structure, norms, and values) on the quality of institutions.
Of course, the measurement of institutions and their contribution to economic different points of view in the literature as to what can and cannot be consi dered particular, there are formal and informal institutions; in addition, institutions are contrasted with organizations, however subtle the differences between the two could be. Both statutory regulations and their implementation and enforcement practices can be considered institutions. Long-term institutions are contrasted with shorter-term policies emphasizing the role of institutions as constraints on choices made by governments and private sector agents. A hierarchy can be established among institutions; basic institutions (such as constitutional provisions) shape the framework of economic activity, including dispute resolution, property turn, could also be considered institutions. Disagreements in the literature about the extent to which institutions affect economic and social outcomes are largely due to different interpretations of the very concept of institution. -ment. Measures of institutions can be formal; in this case, they record presence --preneurs, managers, and citizens) and external experts who are able to compare -tions can be gauged by indirect indicators that are observable and measurable and expected to be correlated with the institutions of interest. Presently, there many dozens of institutional quality measures produced by rating agencies, think tanks, international organi zations and research groups. Although these measures are susceptible to criticism (see Langbein and Knack, 2010; Thomas, 2010; Glaeser et al., 2004) , they are widely used in academic literature, applied analyses, and for other purposes. the protection of property rights, rule of law, business climate, and government accountability and effectiveness. However, it is well-known that the institutional environ ment in Russia is highly uneven across its vast territory, and Russian climate, and regional government effectiveness. Nation-wide institutional meaa better idea of the actual conditions on the ground, one needs institutional measures for particular regions.
Indices and ratings of Russian regional institutions have been produced over the last 10-15 years. Although they are not as varied and numerous as countrylevel indices of institutional quality, their number has exceeded a few dozen.
is a need for an analysis of available indices and for an assessment of their suit ability for academic and practical purposes. This problem has not received proper attention in the litera ture (one of the few such studies is by Libman and -gional institutions and, in particular, to determine to what extent these indicacorre lations of most indicators with one another, one can rank regions in terms of their overall institutional performance. Conversely, a weak correlation be--tutions. In this case, it would be problematic to derive composite institutional indices by aggregating partial indicators such as rule of law, competitiveness of the regional economy, corruption prevention, etc. It should be borne in mind that -
In this paper, we consider as regional institutions various aspects and components of the actual regional environment for economic activities. As noted above, -ministrative, and political decision-making. We base our interpretation on the fact de jure and de facto institutions. Cross-country studies show that formal legal provisions, including constitutional norms such as checks and balances, do not themselves systematically affect economic outcomes; the mere existence of these norms does not guarantee their enforcement (Glaeser et al., 2004) . When governments are not properly accountable, bureaucrats and/or interest groups easily sidestep, if needed, statutory requirements or manipulate and misinterpret them (Acemoglu et al., 2008) .
Implementation practices could be of greater immediate relevance for doing business than the formal rules proper. This is particularly likely in Russia, where lax and arbitrary implementation proverbially compensates for excessive tightness and rigidity of statutory requirements. Furthermore, legislation and other institutions in Russia are commonly misused (for more details see Polishchuk, 2008) , which further widens the gap between formal institutions and the actual conditions on the ground. tions, which emphasizes their dependence on government actions and policies, and on prevailing conventions and behavioral practices. Hence, institutions are contrasted with exogenous factors of regional development such as geography , resource abundance, historically shaped structure of the regional economy, and socio-cultural characteristics and ethnic mix of the population. Sometimes it is difand geography are powerful institutional determinants (technically speaking , they Acemoglu et al., 2001 Acemoglu et al., , 2002 . In turn, institutions affect other factors that are essential for regional development, such as norms and values of the population and human capital accumulation (Tabellini, 2008b) .
relationships. However, cross-regional analyses within the boundaries of a single country could simplify such a task in comparison to cross-country comparative institutional studies, which are prevalent in the literature (Snyder, 2001) . Russian regions are subject to the same federal laws, they are parts of the Russia-wide market, share a common history, and have similar politics, socio-cultural characteristics and other factors and features that affect relationships between institutions and economic outcomes. With such commonality, one can have greater different and often disparate countries of the world, and cross-regional analyses
In the next section of this paper, we analyze the main approaches to the measurement of institutions presented in the literature, mostly at the cross-country level, to draw lessons and recommendations for institutional measurement in Russian regions. We then proceed to a discussion of how Russian regional institutions evolved from the outset of market reforms until the present; we are particularly interested in the causes of institutional diversity between regions observed under the conditions of economic and political decentralization in the 1990s, and
In the empirical part of the paper, we review various sources of data, including regional ratings and rankings, which are available for institutional measurement.
To understand better what exactly such ratings measure and whether they can be used jointly or separately, we analyze how such measures relate to one another. We propose new indices of regional institutions making use of the recent Russian enterprise surveys, which leads to a taxonomy of regional institutional regimes. Next, we discuss regional institutional dynamics against the backdrop of institutional trends nationwide and argue that a decline of the quality of national institutions was concurrent with a divergence of regional institutional regimes. We conclude with a discussion of causes and consequences of institutional diversity among Russian regions.
Measurement of Institutions: Methodology and Dilemmas
The history of institutional measurement began in investment ratings produced by international consultancies for potential investors. These ratings characterized the prospects of doing business in various countries. When economists turned to measuring institutions, they encountered a number of serious methodological and practical problems.
Measurement of institutions cannot be separated from the ongoing debates on the role of institutions in economic development. The main problem is to properly separate institutions from economic outcomes and not consider the latter when measuring institutions lest the link between institutions and development become tautological. The above-mentioned formal procedural approach fully meets this requirement but is not very helpful otherwise because the mere presence of formal rules is not systematically related to the outcomes.
This certainly does not imply that constitutional and other long-term formal Rather, such rules, when they are enacted formally but have no historical and cultural roots and no robust enforcement mechanisms, can be violated with impunity. In particular, it is well-known that simple copycat replication by developing countries of the institutions of developed market democracies rarely brings about the expected result (Weingast, 1997) because such constitutional provisions often die on the vine.
1 Thus, what matter are not the formal provisions per se, but rather their enforcement practices, which renders the formal approach to institutional measurement largely impractical.
The most common alternative is to use subjective opinions and judgments results; the question is, to what extent are these noises random and uncorrelated with one another (if they are, one could hope to reduce noise by aggregating survey results or using opinions of different experts, for example), or do they about an institution are actually inferred from social and economic conditions on the ground. Experts gladly award high marks to institutions in economically successful countries , and do not hesitate to award low scores to institutions of poor, stagnant and politically unstable nations.
cannot be directly observed; therefore, it is natural to use for their assessment observable characteristics, which are expected to be linked to the underlying institutions. It is clear, however, that any statistical inferences obtained by using observable outcomes as institutional measures would be suspected of reverse causality. To mitigate such risks, modern methods of institutional measurement are situations include common administrative procedures (e.g., opening a business, access to utilities, and issuance of permits and licenses (Djankov et al., 2002) ), settlements of comparable commercial disputes (World Bank, 2014) , and frequency of the occurrence of certain institutional pathologies (property expropriation or raider attacks on business). Experts, business consultants, managers and entrepreneurs are requested to assess, e.g., competition, corruption, independence of courts, and effectiveness and competency of the bureaucracy. It is hoped thattortions, and aggregation of institutional measurements obtained from various sources would further improve the precision of measurement and make it less subjective.
Such principles are implemented in the best known and most widely used
The project takes stock of numerous institutional measures produced over the last decades and aggregates those into clusters that correspond to various aspects ( dimensions) of the institutional environment. Authors of the project demarcate six main clusters: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. All data sources used to construct those measures are based on perceptions of institutions by respondents. To defend such a methodology, the authors argue that economic decisions, which are most likely to affect economic performance, are largely based on such perceptions; hence, institutional measures derived in this manner will likely be suitable to describe the effect of institutions on economic outcomes. Aggregate indices of institutional quality mentioned above are widely used in economic studies, both explaining cross-country variations of institutional quality and using institutions to explain economic outcomes. These indicators are also widely used in various international programs and projects (Thomas, cism that calls into question both the measurement methodology and the very economic activity. For example, the notion of corruption incorporates low-level bureaucratic corruption, high-level corruption, political corruption, govern ment capture, patronage etc. Different corruption measures, including those based on corruption perception or on corruption experience, do not agree with one another and are explained by various sets of factors (Treisman, 2007) .
arguably unclear whether there is indeed a real-life object that is measured, rather -related with one another (their pairwise correlations range from 0.6 to 0.9 and higher), and factor analysis yields a principal component explaining over 60% of the total variation of all indices (Langbein and Knack, 2010) . This could be interpreted as evidence of close connectedness of various institutions to one another, in which case one could make judgements about the overall quality of national institutions (Tabellini , 2008a) by using, e.g., the above-mentioned principal component as an aggregate institutional performance index.
Such a high degree of agreement between different measures can be expected when govern ment and/or society have broad discretion over institutional choices and use it in the interests of society which requires commensurate progress along all of the institutional axes (in other words, various institutions are complements rather than substitutes so that, e.g., political stability cannot make up for high making and contra dicts the observed variability of institutions and their bundles across the world. An alternative explanation, corroborated by in-depth analysis of the high correlations between these indices are due to the employed methodology Different institutions play different roles in economic development, which is another indication that institutions are inherently multi-dimensional, should not be aggregated in a single measure of institutional quality, and could not be derived from one such measure. In particular, property rights protection is one of the fundamental factors of sustainable economic development, while the effect of contract enforcement on development is not as evident, although it strongly Furthermore, property rights and contract enforcement have different historical roots, which is another argument for separate rather than aggregate analysis of institutional measures. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the economic success of countries such as China, with weak democratic accountability, absence of checks and balances, and unconventional protection of property rights, which receive low scores in some international rankings (Qian, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2004) .
Another reason why institutions cannot be measured by a single aggregate indicator (or group of closely connected separate measures) is that the effect of a particular institution on economic outcomes depends on other characteristics of the institutional environment (Aoki, 2007) . Due to complementarity of various institutions, similar reforms (such as liberalization, privatization, etc.) could lead to diverse outcomes depending on the institutional backdrop (see, e.g., Polishchuk , 2013; . Obviously, such effects can be analyzed only with multiple institutional measures at hand.
Of particular interest are indirect institutional measures that can be derived from observable economic outcomes. It was noted earlier in the paper that a serious shortcoming of this approach is potential reverse causality. Nevertheless, -cator is the share of informal economy (in the GDP, employment, etc.). Usually, the informal sector offers inferior conditions for doing business by restricting protection to shadow businesses, etc. These extra costs of doing business inforpredatory taxation and other institutional pathologies. The share of informal employment is thus strongly correlated with other measures of institutional quality (Djankov et al., 2002) and could thus itself serve as such a measure.
Institutional performance measures are being produced not only for nations of the world but also for regions of a given country; presently, such measures are available inter alia for subnational units of the US, China, India, Italy, Germany, Poland and other European countries. Measurement of regional institutions is not as active as of the national ones. However, the same methods and approaches usually are applied in both cases (see for example Knack, 2002; Hall and Sobell, 2008; Tabellini, 2008a; Calì et al., 2011; Giordano and Tommasino, 2011; Xu, 2011) , particularly because national and regional indicators are often produced by the same organizations (Karabegovich and McMahon, 2006) .
The two decades-long experience of measuring institutions in various countries and regions of the world demonstrates that institutions are fundamentally diverse, that their effect on economic and social outcomes is as a rule multifaceted and that such measurement calls for a range of different methods and data sources. Another lesson is that a structure found in the institutional diversity should not always be imposed a priori; it might be better to obtain such structure endogenously, deriving it from the available data (e.g., by using factor analysis), and subsequently seek proper interpretation for the obtained measures that are grounded in data rather than hypothesized in advance.
Institutions in Russian Regions
in their investment attractiveness and business environment (Zubarevich, 2010) . The interregional variations in the intensity of red tape, access to infrastructure and markets, costs and risks of doing business that are observed in Russia (Shchetinin et al., 2005; World Bank, 2014) are rarely observed within a single country.
in regional economies, sizes of informal sectors in the regions (Syunyaev and Polishchuk, 2014) , and other key indicators.
Interregional institutional diversity is inevitable for a country as vast and diverse as Russia, with uneven distribution of resources, population, and economic activity. It is known from the literature that geography and natural environment shape institutions and thus could be causes of institutional diversity (Sokoloff and Engerman , 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012) . History also plays a role (Acemoglu et al., 2001) , and indeed, the institutional diversity between Russian regions has deep historical roots (see, e.g., Dower and Markevich, 2014; Kuzmina et al., 2014) .
Therefore, spatial diversity of institutions in Russia is natural in many respects. However, such natural causes notwithstanding, the actual interregional variations in institutional environment far exceed what can be expected from a single restricted, at least over the last decade, regional legislative and regulatory discretion. Interregional variation of institutions in Russia shows that federal legislation is not uniformly and consistently enforced across the country (Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya , 2013) . Hence Russia-wide measures of institutional quality could be at best accurate on the average and remote from the actual conditions on the ground in a particular region. Therefore, there is a strong need to measure institutional performance regionally.
The patchwork of institutional regimes emerged in Russia at the outset of market reforms, when a weak central government was unable to establish and 2 Region-nomies, consolidation and composition of local elites and other exogenous fac-
The transfer of the institution-making power to the regions was a pragmatic versions of regional institutions had to demonstrate their relative strengths and weaknesses in competition for mobile investment and the capacity to stimulate economic growth. It was expected that more successful regional institutions would spread across the country by way of emulation. This logic was based on the well-known concept of market-preserving federalism (Weingast, 1995) , which opens opportunities and creates incentives for competitive selection of efImplementation of this idea in Russia in the 1990s did not produce the ex--they more often than not were adopting dubious ideas restricting competition, the Russian market (Polishchuk, 2001) . One possible cause of such outcomes -tion failed to improve economic performance (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001 ). Further more, institutional outsourcing to the regions was attempted during a deep and prolonged economic recession with minimal investments in the Russian economy. Under those conditions, nation-wide efforts to improve investment climate in a particular region were not properly rewarded because they remained in the shadow of an unfavorable investment reputation of the Russian economy at large (Polishchuk, 2013) .
One would expect that the far-reaching re-centralization of the political sysin the early 2000s should have narrowed interregional institutional disparity. Ingovernors by popular vote were cancelled (to be restored later with considerable restrictions and caveats), and regional chief executives were subordinated to the Russian president.
another in their business environment, even if they are otherwise comparable in terms of the capacity of regional markets, population, and other exogenous factors exhibited further divergence, rather than the expected convergence.) In part, this was due to the limited ability of the federal government to exercise control over regional administrations, even when implementing key nation-wide reforms. Thus, the implementation of the national de-regulation program was delayed and highly -ences remained, e.g., in the pace of reforms of public administration, social services, and market development.
The failure of the central government to effectively resolve the agency problem in choosing regional economic policies and ultimately regional institutions. As a result, regional institutions have been shaped by the incentives of regional elites. Cancellation of gubernatorial elections weakened direct political accountability of regional governments to the society, hence undermining the political mechathe vertical accountability of regional governors to the central government linked performance by the federal center.
to economic development and social welfare; in other words, to establishing and regional institutions took on new, purely pragmatic, administrative and political performance posed a number of serious problems. First, governors are responsible for numerous tasks; hence, the results of their work are inherently multi-dimen--roomed, reaching several hundred in number. Second, even for a relatively small number of criteria, it is unclear how one should aggregate them with one another, what weights should be assigned to particular indicators, and so on. Finally, it is to the performance of local authorities, when to market conditions beyond regional for a number of years have been producing various indices of regional administraActual preferences of the federal center concerning the performance of regional governors are revealed by governor reappointment decisions. The available and public sectors. Instead, reappointment decisions are strongly predicted by the demonstrated electoral support of the ruling elites in federal and regional elections (Zhuravskaya, 2010; Reuter and Robertson, 2012) . The desired voting targets were achieved by various means, and as long as ruling regional elites broad discretion over regional institutions. The latter can thus be considered endogenous political equilibria, shaped by various factors but not pre-determined Some of the above factors, of a geographic or historical nature, are long-run determinants of regional development; otherwise, Russian regional institutions are outcomes of public choice involving regional elites and various interest groups, which are often in symbiotic relationships with one another (Petrov and Titkov, 2010; Syunyaev and Polishchuk, 2014) . As a result, the problem of assessment and measurement of Russian regional institutions is as topical as ever. In the next section, we review the sources of data that could be used to this end.
Data Sources
Regional indices of institutional quality are produced by private rating agengovernment agencies, and individual researchers. In this section, we review the most widely cited sources of data on regional institutions and the new indicators developed by the authors.
3 A summary of the covered institutional measures for Russian regions is presented in Table 1 .
Russian Regional Investment Attractiveness Rating by RA Expert rating agency is perhaps the best-known measure of the quality of institutions in Russian regions. The rating aggregates two components -investment risk and investment potential -and each of those combines several sub-components based on data collected by state statistical services and private consultancies. These data cover the quality of public administration, political and legal risks, and other factors. Weights used to aggregate sub-components are determined by annual surveys of experts from Russian and foreign consulting and investment companies. The RA Expert rating agency does not disclose its methodology in detail.
The business association of small and medium-sized enterprises "Opora Rossii " composes widely known indices of entrepreneurial climate. This business assobusiness climates and ranks regions accordingly. Neither sampling nor methodoLately, regional institutional measures have been regularly produced by central government agencies; this task has acquired added importance after the cancellation of direct gubernatorial elections. This has been sanctioned by a presidential decree that authorized a formal evaluation of the situations in Russian -nance and policies, including indices of public opinion about the functioning and transparency of regional administrations.
4
Interdepartmental Statistical Information System (UniSIS).
5 The Ministry of 3 Our list of institutional indicators is incomplete; in particular, it does not include outdated indices developed many years ago and not updated since. Moreover, as already noted, the boundary between measures of institutions and institutional outcomes is often blurred. Hence, we do not consider various indicators of economic performance and business climate in the Russian regions, which in our opinion are more on the outcomes side. We also skip measures of political institutions, press freedom, or the state of civil society (with the exception of the democracy rating produced by the Carnegie Moscow Center). A short summary of indicators of regional institutional quality, including sources that are not used in this article, can be found in Syunyaev and Polishchuk (2014) . A detailed review of regional corruption indicators is presented in Libman and Kozlov (2013). Regional Development of the Russian Federation also evaluates the performance of regional administrations; it separately calculates measures of effectiveness and outcome-orientation of regional authorities. As noted above, the quality of formal institutions can be assessed by the size of the shadow economy, which provides a shelter from the excessive burdens and risks -verts resources that could other wise be used to support formal institutions and public factors of production. The size of the shadow economy, and hence the quality of institutions, can be gauged by the number of those working in the informal sector. The Russian Statistical Service (Rosstat) annually estimates the size of informal employment for every region, based on quarterly employment surveys. Corruption plays out prominently in measures of institutional environments in one should mention the regional corruption rankings by the Carnegie Moscow Center (CMC) (Petrov and Titkov, 2013) . These ratings are based on expert assessments of the collusion between political and business elites, the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts, and the frequency of corruption scandals. CMC also generated a democracy rating of the regions openness and transparency of the political life of the regions, strength of political opposition, and fairness of elections. Another index of corruption, developed by the National Institute for the System Studies of Entrepreneurship (NISSE), does not measure corruption per se; inefforts toward prevention of corruption, such as enactment of regional anti-corruption legislation, existence of special agencies or bodies to combat corruption, and openness and transparency of anti-corruption policies (Saidullaev and Smirnov, 2010 ).
An important element of the institutional environment is business security, including property rights protection and personal safety of business executives. Russian law enforcement is highly centralized, and civil and criminal law is -data such as the number of economic criminal cases in the region (in relation the degree of violent pressure on business given that criminal law is often used in Russia for solving commercial disputes and for raider attacks.
Since police statistics may, for various reasons, be distorted, it is useful to supplement them with information from alternative sources about attacks on business executives. Belokurova (2012) presents comprehensive data on business-related physical attacks on businessmen, including the number of injured and murdered business executives. Sources of data are publications in the media, police and press releases, and court decisions. Another similar source is media coverage of raider attacks in various regions of Russia (Rochlitz, 2014) . The disadvantages of such indicators are their possible bias due to uneven media development and them (Yakovlev et al., 2014) .
A useful and so far underutilized source of information for the assessment of institutional quality in Russian regions is the EBRD-administered Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) project. This project conducts periodic surveys of enterprises in different transition countries, including Russia. In the last wave, the Russian sample included 4,220 randomly selected questionnaire includes dozens of questions on various aspects of enterprise activities, including, e.g., relationships with regulatory and supervisory bodies, access to resources and infrastructure, competition, dispute resolution, and threats to business. By averaging responses to such questions in a region, one can obtain various regional indicators of institutional quality. This approach does not suffer from possible distortions arising from the use of expert opinions; it describes actual conditions of regional institutions, as observed by those who confront them in their everyday life. Resulting institutional indicators have clear meaning and are derived in a transparent and reproducible manner.
Such indicators can be divided into several categories, including administrative barriers (the costs of compliance with legal and regulatory requirements, passing inspections, obtaining permits and licenses, and tax compliance), the rule of law (fairness, timeliness and effectiveness of the courts), safety of doing business (losses due to criminal actions, costs to businesses of private security services), access to infrastructure (connection to energy grids and telecommunicaof bribes in dealing with various government bodies). A drawback of the BEEPS project as a source of data for institutional measurement is the relatively small number of represented regions.
Interplay of Institutional Indicators
To what extent are the measures of regional institutional quality described in the previous section related to one another? To answer this question, we examine the correlations between those measures. Recall that in the case of measurement of institutional quality at the cross-country level, tight connectedness between different indicators raised questions about the soundness and reliability of measurement techniques and was ascribed to possible measurement errors.
Pairwise correlations between various institutional indices for Russian regions -the table, we assume that for all indicators, higher values correspond to higher institutional quality (e.g., better quality of governance, improved investment climate , and lower corruption or crime rates).
6 Table 2 shows that the links between various institutional measures in Russian regions are far less pronounced and straightforward than in the case of the Governance Matters country indicators. First, correlations of regional indices in al--tions should be expected if various indices agree with one another in estimating institutional quality). Negative correlations suggest either inconsistencies of measurement techniques, or, if the involved institutions differ from one another in their role and purpose, possible substitution between such institutions. Table 2 Pairwise correlations of institutional quality measures.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) Three indicators of executive branch performance included in our analysis are positively associated with one another, which is probably due to similar methods used by the same government agency -the Ministry of Regional Development (MRD) -to derive those measures, and due to their semantic proximity with investment rating with the expected sign. Surprisingly, the risks of doing busiwhere MRD deems regional administrations more effective and that have higher investment ratings and potential.
7 Perhaps this is an indication that economic -els of corruption (measured by the Carnegie Canter) are, as expected, associated with lower crime rates.
gions with larger shares of the informal sector in the regional economy. A possible explanation is that corruption occurs largely in the formal sector, or, in other words, that the informal economy provides a shelter against corruption. Existence of anti-corruption legislation in a region is weakly correlated with the actual levels with earlier studies, concluding, based on cross-country comparisons, that formal institutions themselves do not necessarily generate the expected outcomes.
Another measure of regional institutional quality is the UniSIS index of satisanalogous indicators produced by MRD and is, furthermore, positively correlated with absence of corruption. Additionally, according to UniSIS data, transparency of regional administrations is an important factor of institutional quality rating is weakly correlated with most indicators except the corruption index produced by the same agency.
lack thereof between institutional quality indicators across Russian regions. On -applied institutional studies. Conversely, many indices of Russian regional institutions are produced in a non-transparent manner, and their derivation cannot be -of regional institutions and to what extent it is an artifact of ad hoc approaches to institutional measurement and the subjectivity of expert judgments. It could also be problematic to compress the multidimensional bundle of measures into a smaller number of aggregate indices by factor analysis because fac--tions and their measures but instead, e.g., commonality of measurement techniques. In such a case, interpretation of aggregate factors is hardly possible.
In what follows, we use an alternative approach to discerning a structure in and on a common methodology of measuring institutions by aggregating opini ons expressed by businesspeople about various aspects of their institutional environment. Some of the resulting indices characterize various aspects of the same by using BEEPS data, we restrict our analysis to the 37 regions that were covered by the project, thus reducing the sample size of regions by more than half. Among the indicators of institutions from BEEPS, calculated as regional averages of responses to particular questions, we single out two clusters of indices that we characterize business environment, and as such can be considered institutions. Institutions-services are public factors of production, such as access to infrastructure survey, whereas in the case of access to infrastructure and security, we aggregate responses to several related questions by using a structural equation model 8 (Table 3) . We also construct three indices of institutions-rules, two of which characterize different types of institutional pathologies, whereas the third one measures This could be a sign of a split between various groups of economic and political elites, in which case the regional bureaucracy is not constrained by either Table 3 ).
lower-level bureaucrats. A measure of Type 2 aggregates answers to the survey questions about size of bribes and kickbacks in public procurement. Finally, to measure the rule of law in a region, we aggregate responses to questions about It is well known that centralized corruption is less burdensome and damagopen-access resource for uncontrollable lower level bureaucracy. BEEPS data show that another advantage of Type 2 over Type 1 is higher quality and availability of institutions-services. Indeed, according to Table 4 , all three types of institutions-services are positively regions according to technical conditions of doing business. At the same time, 9 Therefore, public production inputs and services, and a lower total burden of corruption. Such advantages agree with the view that non-democratic regimes with a strong grip on -ger incentives to supply public production inputs (Olson, 1993) . 9 by regional governments much less than are infrastructure and security, which are largely localized within a region. *** ** * Notice that neitherof the above types conforms to the conventional view of enabling institutions, which rule out both high-and low-level corruption, ensure efis symptomatic that the rule of law in Russian regions is orthogonal (both literally related to any of the above-described institutions-services.
Most pairwise correlations of the two institutional types with other indices are -gies, lower number of regions for which BEEPS-originated measures could be calculated, and, last but not least important, could be an indication that the Russian institutional palette is essentially multi-dimensional and cannot be adequately described by only a few indicators. It is noteworthy, however, that institutional Type 1 is negatively correlated with the assessment of regional administrations scale centralized corruption that could be present in such regimes.
Dynamics of Regional Institutions
Apart from institutional differences across regions, changes of institutional quality over time are also of considerable interest. Institutional indicators that are available both across regions and for different periods in time could be used to study institutions along both spatial and temporal dimensions, shedding light on a number of additional questions. Is it true that institutional trends for particular regions follow such trends for the country at large, or deviate from those? Is it possible to improve institutions in a region against the backdrop of institutions deteriorating nationally? Is there any rotation among regions holding top and bottom positions in institutional rankings? Finally, is there evidence of convergence of regional institutions, or are deep variations between regional institutional regimes preserved, perhaps even growing deeper? of the available measures of regional institutions exist only for one period, or if they are available for several periods, those are years far apart from one another. Furthermore, various indices cover non-identical sets of regions. Nevertheless, large number of regions allow us to gain at least an approximate picture of institutional dynamics in Russian regions.
The most regular source of data on regional institutional quality in Russia is the investment climate rating of Russian regions, which is annually updated relative (ordinal) ranking of the investment attractiveness of Russian regions, and thus is not suitable to gauge absolute changes of institutional quality in a given region. However, the ratings show how often regions change their positions with respect to one another, and therefore shed light on how stable (or --gional rankings can actually fall as much as to 50%-60% for selected years, of institutional quality.
Another approach to evaluating regional institutional dynamics is to examine the number of people employed in the informal sector. As indicated above, sign) for the quality of institutions in the formal sector. Data on informal sector employment has been regularly collected for all Russian regions for a number the informal sector is not a subjective and ordinal measure of institutional quality but an objective and cardinal one. As before, we examine the correlation time (Table 6) . Table 5 1998 1999 are affected not only by national institutional trends but also by various local factors.
Finally, a range of proxies for property rights security in Russian regions can be used to illustrate changes in regional institutional regimes. Such proxies make -bases tracing assaults on busines s people (Matveeva, 2007; Belokurova, 2014) and Table 7 lists regions with the highest levels of violent pressure on business for various years, measured by the number of fraud cases, raiding attacks and physical assaults on businesspeople. 10 second half of the 2000s, the groups of regions with the greatest danger of doing business (variously measured) have changed their compositions by more than 10 Fraud cases and attacks against businessmen are normalized on a per capita basis, whereas raiding attacks measures.
Table 7
Regions with the highest levels of violent pressure on business.
Fraud Cases
Attacks against businessmen 1998-2003 2004-2010 1998-2003 2004-2010 1998-2003 2004-2010 During the last two decades, the overall quality of institutions in Russia rea slight improvement was recorded for a number of institutional measures in the early 2000s, it proved to be short-lived. The above indices of criminal pressure on business also demonstrate a lack of clear-cut and sustainable tendency toward institutional strengthening in the country (Fig. 1) .
Although our results indicate that institutions in Russian regions evolve in different directions, one should still expect that regional indicators of economic, legal and political institutions broadly follow overall Russian trends -if for no other reason than because national indices are aggregates of regional ones. Furthermore, as was already noted, a negative image of national institutions suppresses incentives to improve regional ones. Although it is indeed true that in most regions, institutions follow Russia-wide trajectories in accordance instances.
According to Fig. 2 , the number of raider attacks in Russia peaked in the mid2000s. Regions with a large share of heavy industries (e.g., Sverdlovsk oblast and Tatarstan) suffered from multiple raider attacks in the late 1990s and early these regions, the property rights situation became more stable. In Moscow, corporate raiding attacks had a slower start and reached a peak, as in Russia at large, in the mid-2000s. Some other regions, such as Primorsky krai, experienced an increase in raiding attacks only toward the end of the decade, possibly due to massive investments in large-scale infrastructure projects. The interrelationship between national and regional trends can also be explored by using regional informal employment data. For Russia at large, the share of informal employment increased from 16.4% in 2000 to 21.8% period, the share of informal employment increased in 63 regions (particularly in the North Caucasus and some regions in central Russia and Siberia), whereas in 17 regions, the share of informal employment actually decreased. However, (Fig. 3) .
It is usually assumed that the informal sector grows in response to increasing pressure on businesses operating in the formal sector. Although there is some --cients between various measures of violent pressure on business and the share of informal employment in Russian regions, calculated for the years between 2000 between informal employment and violence against entrepreneurs is more clearly pronounced, although this link, too, becomes weaker toward the end of the observation period. 11 This is yet another indication of the complexity and geographic, economic and other idiosyncratic factors. -neity. It is important to know how the spatial institutional disparity evolves over time, and in particular, whether there is institutional convergence of Russian re--best-practice patterns because the regions that are lagging behind their neighbors are forced to improve their institutions in order not to lose out in the competition for mobile investments and other resources. However, essential preconditions of Russia-wide markets, are not met in the Russian context. Therefore, the question of conversion or diversion of regional institutions must be answered empirically.
To this end, we use once again the share of informal employment to examine how the national average of such shares and their variances evolve over time. Table 9 shows that against the backdrop of nationally declining institutional quality, be that the inadequate national institutions suppress investments in the Russian economy and impede the development of a national market and the integration of regions into a single economic space, which could have led to institutional convergence across the country. Instead, what we observe is an ongoing institutional 11 Recall that a negative association between informal economy and violence against businesses could be an indication that the informal economy provides shelter from crime. Note: raid = number of raiding attacks per year and region; vic = numbers of businessmen injured or killed a region in the given year; vicw = numbers of businessmen injured or killed per year and region weighted by regional population; 159 = number of fraud cases per year and region weighted by regional population; inf = % share of the regional workforce employed in the informal sector.
Table 9
Mean and variance for the share of informal sector employment.
Conclusion: Causes and Consequences of Institutional Divergence
Availability of clearly interpretable indices of institutional quality improves the odds of quantifying the roles of institutions in socio-economic development in Russian regions, and of identifying the root causes of the institutional heterogeneity across the country. Such analyses could reveal the potential for institutional reform in advancing regional development and long-term exogenous determinants of regional institutions that facilitate or impede progressive institutional change.
In-depth discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper, which is primarily about institutional measurement per se, rather than using institutional measures in applied regional studies. We will conclude with several examples drawn from the recent literature that illustrate how regional institutional measurement expands opportunities for linking regional institutions to their causes and consequences.
In a number of papers, institutional measures are used to explain interregional variations of economic outcomes. Thus, corruption, crime, and excessive red tape are shown to impede foreign direct investments in Russian regions (Kuzmina et al., 2014) . Taking a different perspective, Menyashev and Polishchuk (2011) demonstrate that accountability of local administrations affects life satisfaction in Russian cities.
comes. Thus, liberalization of a regional economy (easing licensing requirements and cutting the number of inspections) complements the quality of regional governance; in regions with transparent administrations, liberalization boosts SME development, whereas no such effect is observed in poorly governed regions ( Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya, 2013) . In the same vein, institutional quality, including control of corruption, affects the economic outcomes of privatization. absent in regions with weak institutions, in part because land ownership increases the risks of raider attacks.
The conditions of regional institutions also affect the allocation of talent in the economy and ultimately the economic returns to investments in human capital. In Russian regions with strong institutions, the percentage of talented students choosing sciences and engineering as study areas is higher in comparison to regions with weak institutions, in which education in law and public administration is far more popular (Natkhov and Polishchuk, 2012) .
The value of reliable institutional measures is not only in establishing and quantifying links from institutions to outcomes but also in revealing historical, social and political causes of institutional variations between regions. Such analysis, being of considerable interest in and of itself, could also be useful in ruling out reverse causaliof institutional quality measures could serve as instrumental variables providing consistent estimators of the association between institutions and development.
Institutional diversity is often rooted in history. Thus, Kuzmina et al. (2014) over 100 years ago. Similarly, Dower and Markevich (2014) established a connection between the recent privatization of the Russian economy and the inten-stable views and preferences that could have been shaped by historical events and continue to shape institutional outcomes in the present era. The quality of regional institutions and of subnational governance in Russia -termined by historical, geographical or other exogenous factors. Menyashev and Polishchuk (2011) show that the link between civic culture and local government accountability observed in a number of European countries holds for Russia. The ethnic mix of the population many decades ago could be uncorrelated with -nomic institutions (Grosfeld et al., 2013) .
Finally, the quality of regional institutions, including the investment climate, may be affected by regional political processes, symbiotic relationships between representation in the political domain. Thus, political competition in a region has an effect on the activities of business associ ations that in turn are relevant for the protection of property rights (Pyle, 2011) . Protection of property rights and the investment attractiveness of regions depend on the rotation of regional governors and
The above examples do not exhaust the analytical possibilities that are opened up by access to reliable indicators of regional institutional quality. One can anticipate that improvement in regional institutional measurement will increase the quantity and quality of such studies in the future.
